The twentieth century saw the legalization of a system for the treatment of prisoners of war (POWs). This system had notable successes in improving the treatment of POWs in some cases, while in other cases, the system failed to induce states to abandon the abuse and murder of soldiers who surrendered to their forces during war. This paper seeks to explain the form of the legal rules and the system they induce to handle POWs, with a secondary concern of understanding why that institution fails and succeeds in different cases.
International institutions vary widely in their forms. International law falls to the loose end of the spectrum of international institutions. Compared to other international institutions surveyed in this volume, the laws of war do not require recurrent decisions on proper policies as the International Air Transport Association did nor do they reach judgments about the facts in individual cases as dispute resolution panels do. i Instead, treaties on POWs and other laws of war set standards and prescribe mechanisms for their members to use when they are at war with one another. Enforcement of the standards is left to the parties themselves. Within this volume, this chapter covers an example of how normative values legalized into a treaty shape state behavior. It also addresses the question of this project; why do these treaties take the form they do?
Informal understandings on the treatment of prisoners of war are as old as history. In this century, formal negotiations have developed those understandings into institutional arrangements that prescribe appropriate treatment and provide ways for states to verify that their soldiers taken prisoner are treated according to the agreement. This paper seeks to explain those arrangements as a rational response to the strategic problems that prisoners of war present. POWs Rational responses to these strategic problems characterize the POW system. The paper seeks then to understand not just the legal principles on the treatment of POWs but also the system of monitoring and enforcement built on those principles.
These strategic problems are the specific realization of the independent variables in the Rational International Institutions Project (RIIP) in this issue-area . ii The first three strategic problems correspond to the following independent variables of the RIIP framework: uncertainty about behavior (UNCERT(B)), distribution under uncertainty about preferences (DIST and UNCERT(P)), and enforcement under uncertainty about behavior (ENF and UNCERT(B)), respectively. The fourth strategic problem concerns the relations between the state and its citizens that lays beyond the scope of the RIIP framework. I then test the hypotheses of the RIIP project about how these independent variables determine the membership (MEMB), centralization (CENT), and flexibility (FLEX) of the POW system. Briefly, I find that the POW system corresponds to a rational design to respond to the four strategic problems. The system has a general standard of treatment that avoids specific negotiations of the applicable standard for particular wars. Ratification of the standard screens out some states that have no interest in following the standard. The standards produce general reciprocal responses which are irregular and disproportionate to apparent violations of the standard. When the system breaks down, it fails at the individual level as well as the state level.
The power to monitor the agreement is devolved away from the warring parties.
The cases broadly supports the hypotheses of the RIIP project on membership (MEMB), centralization (CENT), and enforcement (ENF). The specific hypotheses on how uncertainty about preferences (UNCERT(P)) and distributional issues (DIST) affect membership, how uncertainty about behavior (UNCERT(B)) and the number of actors (NUMB) affect centralization, and how uncertainty about the state of the world (UNCERT(S)) and the number of actors affect flexibility are all supported in this case. The case does not support the framework hypotheses on the effect of enforcement on membership or centralization nor the effect of distribution on flexibility. Instead, this case suggests greater levels of complexity for these hypotheses. For example, the POW system is centralized in the determination of its standards but decentralized in its enforcement. The POW case also suggests that rational design of institutions depends on the strategic problems posed by an issue, and consequently the hypotheses of the RIIP project should hold only when the strategic problems in their logic are found in the case being examined.
The next section discusses some general issues about the laws of war as an international institution. I then present the four strategic problems and rational institutional responses to each.
A description of the POW system in practice allows a comparison of the predicted form of the institutions with their reality. The hypotheses of the RIIP project are evaluated for this case. I then examine some alternative arrangements for handling POWs and some alternative explanations.
How Can the Laws of War Work?
Political institutions must be self-enforcing to be sustained. In the language of game theory, institutions must form an equilibrium of a game, both in the sense that a particular institution induces equilibrium behavior and in the sense that the particular institution must be in equilibrium within the set of all possible institutions, including none. iii Kenneth Shepsle calls these the questions of institutional equilibrium and equilibrium institutions. iv
The POW treaties are one example of the laws of war, prewar agreements about acceptable conduct during wartime. Such prewar agreements operate as institutions by shaping the decisions of actors during wartime. The agreements codify standards of treatment for POWs and rules for verifying that those standards are being carried out. The institutional equilibrium for the laws of war is the wartime behavior of states given the existing treaties. Such behavior covers not just treatment of POWs by states and individuals, but also how actors develop and use the system for the treatment of POWs. An agreed standard can shape what strategies (in the broadest sense of strategy as being all actions undertaken during war) states use to prevail in a war. A prewar agreement to abjure certain strategies can be upheld during war when reciprocity and audience costs make both sides unwilling to be the first to use a banned strategy. v The treaties of the laws of war are a public means for states to accept and understand their obligations during wartime. The agreement does not prevent the parties from acting in their best interest; instead, it sways the actors over what strategies they use in their pursuit of victory.
If there are enforceable prewar agreements to restrict violence during wartime, then there are likely to be many different enforceable agreements. Precise standards matter, and there are many different precise standards that are enforceable. The choice among these many different standards is the question of equilibrium institutions. A rational approach to international institutions requires that existing institutions be Pareto optimal in the set of enforceable institutions; some party would be worse off if an institution was changed to another enforceable institution. Otherwise, no actor would object to a change of the institution, and it would not persist. Later, I will consider some alternative arrangement for handling POWs and compare them to the existing institutions to assist in the judgment of why the latter exists.
The laws of war rely on reciprocity for enforcement. Violations of the rules may be deterred by reciprocal response. However, reciprocity can be implemented in many ways: what actions trigger a response, who should respond to an unacceptable action, and what responses are properly reciprocal rather than violations themselves? Reciprocity then requires shared understandings about appropriate treatment and responses that are institutional in nature. The understanding of how reciprocity will be employed on an issue shapes behavior on that issue (institutional equilibrium), that understanding can be changed if none oppose a change (equilibrium institutions). The laws of war can be thought of as the codification of the shared understanding at the heart of reciprocal enforcement of standards.
Having discussed the institutional features of the laws of war in general, I now turn to the specifics of prisoners of war. Actors create institutions to address problems they face, and the character of those institutions reflect those problems and how they could be addressed. The next section lays out four strategic problems presented to states by the POW issue and discusses rational responses to those problems.
Four Strategic Problems
The issue of how to handle POWs raises four strategic problems that shape the institutions addressing their treatment. In this section, I describe each of these strategic problems and discuss the institutional response to each problem in the literature on rational institutions.
This section details what institutional form we should expect on the POW issue and explains the logic underlying those forms. The four strategic problems, as we shall see, are closely related in practice; I separate them here in order to apply results in the literature that analyses these problems separately.
Monitoring Under Noise
Institutions built on reciprocity require the actors to monitor each other's actions so they can respond to violations of an agreement. Noise--uncertainty about behavior in the RIIP framework (UNCERT(B))--makes monitoring a significant issue for institutions because actors cannot determine exactly what one another has done. Instead, actors must draw inferences about others' actions from outcomes. Because outcomes result in part from factors outside the control of the actors, drawing such inferences is not straightforward. A classic example of uncertainty about behavior in economics is cartel enforcement if the members of the cartel can only observe the market price. vi They would like to know if any member of the cartel has cheated on the agreement by producing more their agreed share. However, others' production cannot be observed directly. If one member overproduces, the market price should drop. Production alone, however, does not determine price; a drop in demand could also cause the price to drop. Should the members of the cartel respond to a drop in price by raising their own production, the appropriate reciprocal response if a member has cheated on their agreement? Alternatively, problems of uncertainty about behavior can sometimes be addressed by the creation of neutral actor to collect and disseminate information. Second, much that occurs on a battlefield lies outside the view of commanders, and so they rely on reports from lower-level personnel about the conduct of their own soldiers on the field. In the case of atrocities, few soldiers are willing to report that they personally have committed such acts. Common accounts of summary killings of prisoners report that unspecified others carried out the act, and often such reports are indirect rather than eyewitness reports of the killing. Within camps, individual camp commanders and guards have some autonomy in how they operate. Factors outside the control of a detaining power may make it impossible for them to provide full support for POWs. The vagaries of war make it possible for a state to kill its own men taken prisoners inadvertently in the course of military operations. During the Second World War, submarines of the United States Navy sank Japanese ships transporting Americans held prisoners to Japan. ix A neutral actor is not likely to be helpful in addressing this source of noise because of the large amount of action to observe and the danger of combat to observers. Both of the above problems create noise; POWs may not receive treatment up to the standards of the treaties even though the detaining power has tried to live up to its treaty obligations.
Uncertainty about behavior has consequences about resolving uncertainty about preferences. A government at war attempts to judge the preferences of its opponent--that is, whether the opponent intends to honor its treaty obligations--by observing the opponent's behavior. Uncertainty about behavior can make the inference from behavior to preference difficult. Errors of both overreaction and underreaction to reports of violations are possible under noise, and any system must address this inferential problem and the appropriate response in the face of it.
The rational response to uncertainty about behavior requires the movement from direct and immediate reciprocity to more general reciprocity involving "bright lines" of acceptable outcomes. x Tit-for-tat responses to noise can lead to feuds of reciprocal punishments triggered by outside influences, rather than a defection from the agreement. Instead, actors should ignore small violations of the agreement and only respond to large violations of the accepted standard.
A common standard of levels of violations deemed minor and acceptable allows the actors both to judge one another's likely responses to their own actions and avoid reciprocal feuds triggered by small amounts of noise. Because reciprocal punishment are not always carried out in response to violations that appear minor, such punishments must be disproportionate in order to carry the same deterrent effect as direct and immediate reciprocal sanctions. Then uncertainty about behavior has two primary effects on reciprocal enforcement of an agreed standard: one, the sides adopt a common standard of acceptable behavior to judge significant defections, and two, punishments become irregular and disproportionate to violations.
Individual as Opposed to State Violations
An effective agreement on the treatment of POWs must operate not only at the state level but also at the individual level. The greatest risk of being killed as a POW occurs between the time that the soldier indicates he wants to surrender to the time he enters a holding area behind enemy lines. xi Soldiers of even the best disciplined armies kill men attempting to surrender for a variety of reasons, including personal revenge, combat stress, and an immediate concern not to be bothered with the presence and care of prisoners. xii The use of surrender as a ruse for surprise attack occurs at times. Factors that could be described as cultural can also make the practical act 
Variations in Preferred Treatment of POWs
A common standard of treatment of POWs requires agreement on many aspects of the handling of prisoners. However, states disagree about how prisoners should be treated. Each would like to see its own preferred standard be enforced and may choose to violate an agreed standard to do so. Other states are willing to live within an agreed standard even though they may prefer some other specific standard. At an extreme, a state may choose not to sign an agreement because it disagrees with specific provisions in the draft agreement; the Soviet Union did not sign the 1929 Geneva agreement on POWs because it allowed captor nations to treat officers and soldiers differently. In short, the adoption of any standard creates a distributional problem, xix and furthermore, differences in preferences about treatment create uncertainty about other states' motivations and so uncertainty about their future actions. In the RIIP framework, this is a distributional problem (DIST) exacerbated by uncertainty about preferences (UNCERT(P)).
To give the reader a sense of the range of how states think POWs should be treated, consider the strategic advantages states at war can gain through their treatment of the men they take prisoner. Bad treatment of POWs they hold encourages soldiers of the opposing side not to take prisoners themselves, making it harder for your soldiers to surrender. Mistreatment does have consequences on the battlefield as rumors of how the other side treats POWs spread.
Soldiers generally believe that reciprocity will hold; one German soldier reacted after watching the SS massacre about 300 Russian POWs, "It was already clear to us that it would have repercussions. That our prisoners [in Russian hands] would be treated in the same way." xx States may wish to treat prisoners they take poorly in order to fortify their own soldiers' willingness to fight hard on the battlefield. In some cases, POWs have been recruited into the army of the detaining power, although coercion is often present in such recruiting appeals, particularly when joining the enemy army is a way out of terrible treatment in POW camps. xxi POWs are commonly used as a labor force, although they are banned by treaty from work in a state's war effort. Prisoners often welcome work, particularly agricultural work, as a way out of a dreary existence in camps. The question is what work and under what conditions. At the extreme, the Germans and Japanese during the Second World War used some POWs as close to slave labor in mines and railroad construction. The loss of life for those forced to work in those conditions was extremely high. German treatment of Soviet soldiers used as mine labor was so bad that the Nazis had to improve the prisoners' diet and accommodations, and limit their work hours just to get any valuable work out of them. xxii Useful military information can also be extracted from prisoners, both on the battlefield (where such acts are more common) and behind the lines. Keeping prisoners up to the standards of the POW treaties is costly to the detaining power, and so it is tempting for states to cheat on the standards.
There are also important ideological and moral differences over the treatment of prisoners. Japan sought to inculcate their soldiers with the doctrine that troops who surrendered would be considered dead for all purposes by the home country. xxiii This doctrine helped to create the exceptional willingness to die in combat shown by Japanese soldiers during the Second World War. It also led to a general contempt towards soldiers of other nations who surrendered to the Japanese. In contrast, democratic states generally provide good treatment of POWs as an expression of the value they place on the protection of the individual, despite the political debate it triggers about whether POWs are being treated too well under the circumstances. Finally, racial attitudes direct state policy towards the mistreatment of POWs, most notably Nazi racist policies in Eastern Europe during the Second World War. This wide range of strategic consequences from the treatment of POWs leads to a wide range of plausible positions that states can take on the treatment of POWs. Some try to provide a reasonable existence to the men they take prisoner, while other states seize the advantages of mistreating POWs. State leaders make judgments about how their state will treat POWs given their state's strategic situation and values. In terms of institutional design, a state's preferences reflect the considerations underlying these judgments.
These differences in state preferences create the dilemma of inferring future actions from unknown preferences. State leaders can try to infer other's preferences from observed events.
Often, actors would like information on others' preferences, and are willing to transmit such information about their own preferences, before acting. One institutional response to this dilemma is to create systems that allow states to signal their preferences to one another or force them to screen themselves in or out of a group. Typically, such signals or screens require costs to provide an incentive for actors with different preferences to separate themselves. xxiv Such costs could arise within the process itself though the consequences of separation, making costless actions--"cheap talk"--into effective signals. xxv Outside parties can then judge better the preferences, and likely future actions, of a state. xxvi Signaling or screening costs in international politics are commonly attributed to audience costs. xxvii The signal may set up dynamics by itself that lead to other actors imposing costs on the state leader who sent the signal. Such audiences could be external or internal. Other states might use violations of treaty obligations to judge the reliability of future promises; interested domestic parties could choose to remove their leader after he or she fails to uphold a state obligation. xxviii Such audience costs could be sufficient to make treaty obligations binding in some cases. A treaty would screen out some states that are unwilling to live up to the obligations of the treaty, and so inform other states that ratifying states were more likely to carry out their obligations under the treaty.
The adoption of a single standard of conduct through a treaty creates a screen to help separate those states who are willing to live with the agreed standard from those who are not.
Further, a uniform standard also solves the distributional problem that setting a standard poses.
Once a standard is set, the question moves from "which standard is appropriate" to "which states are willing to comply with this standard?" A uniform treaty then addresses problems of both distribution and uncertainty about preference inherent in the question of variation of preferred treatment of POWs.
The arguments above reflect the logics to that behind the RIIP hypotheses on how a greater number of actors cause centralization and how uncertainty over preferences produces restrictive membership. A single standard of conduct centralizes the judgment of who accepts a standard. Restricting membership in the system to ratifying states helps to reduce uncertainty over preferences for appropriate treatment of POWs.
Raising a Mass Army
Modern warfare is fought by mass armies, mobilized out of the citizenry of the nation.
Conscription raises mass armies, and most armies since the Napoleonic Wars have relied on some form of conscription, particularly during wartime. Understandably, many able-bodied citizens are reluctant to face the risks of combat. Draft evasion and desertion are serious threats to raising a mass army and sustaining it in combat. The well-known logic of public goods applies here; all citizens enjoy the benefit of a victorious army, while those killed or maimed in combat and their families bear the cost.
Nevertheless, large numbers of citizens are willing to fight for their country when drafted, and others are willing to volunteer to fight (although the likelihood of being drafted does drive some enlistments in wartime). Margaret Levy calls this behavior contingent consent. xxix Citizens are more willing to serve, and less likely to resist conscription, when they perceive that the state treats them fairly. Such fairness is judged by treatment of potential inductees, war aims, and citizens' overall view of the legitimacy of their government. Enforcement against those who try to evade the system helps to create a sense that the system treats all fairly. Quasi-voluntary compliance then combines the cooperation of citizens with enforcement against those who do not cooperate. All types of political systems rely on a combination of citizen compliance and state coercion to fill out their mass armies, although democracies rely on coercion less than other systems do. 
The Prisoner of War System
The Geneva Conventions of the treatment of prisoners of war is the centerpiece of the institutions to deal with POWs. xxx The rules codified in the treaties are applicable to all wars between members of the treaty. The treaties create a common standard which is subject only to limited and specified revision by individual pairs of warring states. For example, warring states may agree to exchange prisoners during wartime, but they are under no obligation to work out an exchange agreement. The POW treaties cover just about every facet of treatment of prisoners from the time of capture to repatriation after the war is over. Diet, discipline, the right to escape, the type of work that POWs can perform, and who can qualify as a POW are among the topics covered in the 1949 Geneva Convention. The detail that is specified on each of these issues has increased through the series of the three Geneva Conventions. Enforcement of those treaties is decentralized. The warring parties alone have the ability to counter behavior that violates the treaties. Although member states at war have the power to prosecute and punish violators of the treaties from the other side, they rarely choose to, in part out of concern for retaliation against their own soldiers held captive. Even trials for criminal acts committed during captivity are treated cautiously. For instance, there were several cases where Nazis held prisoner in the United States killed other German POWs for acts they deemed disloyal to the Nazi regime. The United States did prosecute the killers, although it chose not to carry out the death penalties until after the war was over. xxxi Reciprocity is the unstated but recognized tool of enforcement. When the rules are generally observed in a conflict, protests of mistreatment are the first step and often suffice to remedy particular cases of mistreatment. Sometimes, very direct reciprocal sanctions are used by the parties. After the Dieppe Raid in 1942, a number of Germans taken prisoner by the Canadians during the raid were found with the hands tied, a violation of the rules. In response, the Germans then bound a specified number of Commonwealth soldiers they held prisoner, leading to counter sanctions by the British against Germans they held prisoners. xxxii In conflicts where major violations of the rules occur at the state level, reciprocity in general terms occurs. Both sides typically mistreat prisoners in these wars, with the notable exception being treatment of Japanese taken prisoner by the United States and Commonwealth forces during the Second World War. Breakdowns of the agreement of treatment of POWs often also leads to direct retaliation by soldiers of both sides on the battlefield; surrendering becomes a much riskier proposition than in other wars (not that the act of surrendering is ever free of the risk of killing by the captors).
Because POWs are held behind enemy lines, the treaties provide for independent monitors of camp conditions. The Protecting Powers, the neutral states that operate as diplomatic liaisons for one warring state within the territory of the other, are the primary monitors of the agreement. Representatives of each Protecting Power have the responsibility to compile lists of soldiers taken prisoner, to convey mail to and from POWs, and to monitor conditions in camps, including discipline of POWs, and must be given free rein by states holding POWs to do these tasks. Once war begins, each Protecting Power establishes a POW bureau to act as a clearinghouse for information on prisoners. In practice, the Red Cross also performs many of the same roles, particularly when the sides find it difficult to appoint a Protecting Power. Its unique role as a humane agency that ministers to POWs, particularly those wounded in combat, places the Red Cross in the appropriate position to serve as a monitor. In either case, the collection of information is taken away from the national agents of either warring party. MEMB|ENF is the hypothesis about enforcement as independent variable relates to membership as dependent variable.
Membership
Membership of an institution, according to the project, should be determined by the severity of the enforcement and distributional problems and the level and type of uncertainty.
The membership rules of the POW system are not restrictive, only ratification of the treaties is required for membership. Ratification of the treaties does appear to screen out some states which have no intention of following the standards, so the actual membership is not universal. One can imagine more restrictive membership tied to stronger enforcement of the system, as is the case in the recent Chemical Weapons Convention. There member states may not trade restricted chemicals, both poisonous ones and their chemical precursors, to nonmembers. This restriction provides a positive incentive to sign the treaty, which in turn has much stricter international inspections than earlier treaties.
The case of the POW treaties has a mixed record on the conjectures on membership, primarily because the logic of that system differs from the logic underlying the hypotheses of the framework. There is an enforcement problem on POWs between states at war that have ratified the treaties. Then the framework expects that membership should be restrictive (MEMB|ENF) to exclude possible defectors and free riders. As pointed out above, the restrictions on membership are weak, only ratification is required. However, there really is not a question of free riding on the POW standards; the identification of a common standard and which states are willing to live by that standard is the issue. Membership in the POW treaties does reduce uncertainty by screening out some states that are not willing to live within the standards set out by the treaty, supporting the conjecture on membership and uncertainty over preferences (MEMB|UNCERT(P)). The conjecture that inclusive membership increases with the severity of the distributional problem (MEMB|DIST), is weakly supported here. Opting in is a signal that a state will abide by the rules of the system, which solves the distributional problem of agreeing on a particular standard. However, the logic of membership in the POW issue is different from the logic behind this conjecture in the theme paper. In the latter, inclusive membership allows for tradeoffs to solve distributional problems; here, the distributional problem is solved by only admitting states who signal their willingness to abide by the standards of the treaty.
Centralization
The mix of centralization and decentralization in the POW system both supports and contradicts the conjectures of the project on centralization. The negotiation and ratification of the treaties is centralized, while the enforcement is decentralized. Information collection is both, although making neutral parties responsible for information collection is more important to the system than whether information collection is centralized in the hands of one party. Setting of general standards faces the problem of uncertainty about other nations' intentions to treat enemy soldiers they take prisoners in the absence of any evidence but their words; enforcement faces just the problem of inferring intentions from actions in the face of noise. Centralization of treaty negotiation and ratification then deals with a more profound uncertainty than centralization of enforcement does.
The conjecture on centralization and uncertainty about behavior (CENT|UNCERT(B)) would explain why the negotiation and ratification is more centralized than enforcement in the POW system. Uncertainty about preferences, and hence future behavior, leads to a centralized system of setting and ratifying standards to address that uncertainty. xl Enforcement is decentralized in the POW system because, unlike the logic of the conjecture on uncertainty about behavior, individual parties, rather than all states, enforce the agreement on each other. The large number of actors involved in the negotiation of the treaties leads to a centralized system for setting the standards of conduct, while the dyadic nature of war leads to a decentralized system of enforcement and monitoring, in accord with the conjecture on how the number of actors drives centralization (CENT|NUMB). The conjecture on centralization and enforcement problems (CENT|ENF) is not supported in this case. Enforcement is relatively decentralized contrary to the hypothesis on enforcement and centralization; responsibility for enforcement is diffused to member states rather than centralized. The problems of uncertainty, rather than distributional and enforcement problems, drive centralization on the POW issue. When the POW system fails to fit the conjectures of the RIIP project, the strategic logic of the system differs from that underlying those conjectures. For example, the conjecture that greater severity of the enforcement problem leads to more restrictive membership follows from a public goods logic where membership is used to prevent free riding. However, the logic of membership in the POW system is screening out those states unwilling to accept the standard.
The strategic problem addressed by the POW system here-screening--differs from the strategic problem of free riding assumed in the argument in the framework about how enforcement problems drive membership. This observation suggests that we should recognize that the institutions in an issue area depend on the strategic problems posed by that issue. The RIIP conjectures follow from certain strategic problems, so we should not be surprised that those conjectures do not hold when the assumed strategic problems are not present in the issue area.
Alternative Institutional Arrangements for POWs
To draw out the institutional logic of the POW system, I consider some alternative institutional arrangements for handling POWs. This thought experiment examines how other systems would shape state and individual responses to the strategic problems present with POWs as discussed earlier. This section helps to focus how the POW system deals with the strategic problems and to understand why the current system would not be replaced with one of the alternatives.
The first alternative is no framework whatsoever. This is not to say that there would be no ideas about the proper treatment of POWs, but rather that those ideas would not be formalized in a legal treaty and system. Instead, any agreement between warring parties on the treatment of POWs would be ad hoc and particular to each individual war. The lack of an institution has the advantage that the warring parties would prefer an ad hoc agreement to the common standards in the POW treaties. Because states differ in their views of appropriate treatment, ad hoc agreements can be tailored to the specific preferences of the particular warring parties, rather than imposing a general agreement that has been negotiated to incorporate the views of all signing parties to the multilateral treaty. This added flexibility carries serious drawbacks however. First, ad hoc agreements are likely to be difficult to negotiate during wartime because the specific agreement can have an effect on the outcome of a war. For instance, a state that wishes to exploit POWs as slave labor can gain an advantage over an opponent who will not use POWs in that way. Indeed, such differences in how POWs should be treated underlie the notable failures of that system. Second, an ad hoc agreement is likely to be a "lowest common denominator" between the warring parties. The party with the higher standard will have to accept a lower standard than it wishes in order to reach an agreement over POWs. In a general treaty, all signing parties operate in ignorance of what wars they will fight in the future, and so the distributive conflict among states is reduced. If many different standards can be enforced in wartime, it may be possible to get states to agree to the most rigorous standard beforehand.
Third, ad hoc agreements forfeit the screening effects of ratification. Finally, it will be difficult to train troops in their rights and responsibilities under an ad hoc system. The two-level problem should be worse under ad hoc agreements for the lack of such training. This discussion of alternate institutions should not be taken to state that the existing institutions are the "best" possible. Rather, the system exists, continues, and succeeds because it provides a workable solution to the strategic problems posed by POWs. If one of these alternatives was clearly better for all, we would expect that the system would move towards it. During the Russo-Japanese War and the First World War, Japan scrupulously fulfilled its obligations to Russian and German soldiers they took prisoner under the Conventions of the time. In both cases, the Japanese government used good treatment of POWs to gain sympathy among the Western Powers. Further, Japanese soldiers who had been captured were not generally tried by a court martial upon their return to Japan. Some were subject to scorn when they returning to their villages. By the Second World War, Japanese policy had switched to neglect of prisoners at its best and their outright abuse at its worst and discouraging surrender by their own troops through training and social pressure in the ranks. Throughout this time.
Japanese cultural attitudes appear to be constant about the shame of surrender. xliii There were limits to how far Nazi ideology could shape their treatment of POWs as well. and cultural values play a role in that judgment. Realists make a similar mistake when they argue that institutions are epiphenomenal in international politics, that outcomes are purely driven by interests and power. xlv Institutions influence a state's judgment of how it should pursue its interests using its power; different institutions could produce a different pattern of its pursuit of its interests through power.
Nazi Germany treated poorly

Conclusion
The POW system addresses four strategic problems in the issue area: monitoring under noise, variation in preferred treatment of POWs, individual as opposed to state violations, and raising a mass army. The system relies on an universal standard that applies to all wars between ratifying states. Ratification serves as a screen that helps states identify which states may not live up to the standards of the treaty. Enforcement is generally reciprocal, although the consequences of violations are often seen on the battlefield instead of at the state level. The Red Cross and Protecting Power serve as neutral monitors of the standards. When the agreements break down at the state level, they also fail at the individual level on the battlefield. The existence of a standard helps ratifying states to recruit soldiers.
The case of the POW system suggests that international law, and norms more generally, can operate as institutions in international politics. These standards persist and shape but do not determine state actions. Because many standards could be enforced during wartime, the particular agreement helps to fix state behavior by prescribing what behavior is unacceptable and what the consequences of unacceptable behavior may be. None of this argument should be taken to suggest that other factors such as state preferences are irrelevant to the treatment of POWs.
Rather, the interaction of the institution and preferences produce behavior.
The overall project of rational international institutions needs to attend to variations in the strategic dynamics of different issues more carefully. Rational institutional design contends that observed institutions fit the demands of the issue they address. Otherwise, the institutions would be replaced by alternatives that address those issues better in the eyes of the relevant actors.
Some strategic problems, like provision of public goods, are well-known. Not all problems are appropriately thought of as public goods, however. Careful consideration of the problems posed by an issue is necessary for analyzing what institutions we should expect in that area.
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